Let’s hear the voice of the Kurds (II)

First, let’s compare the vote distribution of the elections of 2007 and today. You’ll remember, the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, experienced a very surprising development during the 2007 elections as the Democratic Society Party, or DTP, suffered an important loss in the region, obtaining only 4.9 percent of the votes. The AKP suddenly took the position of a new player in the region. This was important because the AKP’s rise made it a real possibility that the DTP could be kicked out of the region if it pushed the limits.

The AKP’s self-confidence increased. Southeastern voters supported those who served right and not for the sake of Kurdishness. This belief excited the AKP in the local elections in 2009. If such a development was to be realized, then a great loss of prestige could be inflicted on the terror organization. The prime minister rolled up his sleeves and realized an extremely ambitious campaign. He confronted citizens of Kurdish origin.

AKP beaten by its own politics in Southeast

He said: "If you wish to obtain services, vote for us. If you wish to obtain an identity, then vote for someone else." He even gave speeches that implied "love it or leave it." The goal was to show the Kurdish voters a carrot, state that the DTP is not able to supply municipality services properly and send across the message, "If you vote for me I’ll supply my services." But he was not content with this message and instead distributed attractive commodities like coal and washing machines in the region. He blinked at them by saying, "I’ll make you rich." There is more É

With TRT-6 he tried to satisfy the Kurds’ identity expectation, and by using a Kurdish sentence during Nevruz (the coming of spring) festivities, he tried to satisfy their language expectations. Many of us believed that the AKP was closer to the Kurdish issue and that if there were a leader who could solve this problem, it would be him. Such an impression had emerged. But the AKP could not make it up to our citizens of Kurdish origin. One reason was that it did not take concrete steps, meaning it could not meet the expectation of Kurdish citizens. Other reasons include unique perceptions of Kurds.

w The Kurds reacted to Erdoğan creating an environment full of expectations but not sticking to his promises. They realized and concluded that they are facing a prime minister who only speaks but does not take action.

w This belief was also strengthened by taking slow steps toward the European Union and nearly shelving the project.

w Attempts by the AKP in Diyarbakır to lay their hand on places like Tunceli, which is considered the castle of the DTP, scared the Kurds and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or the PKK. They could not accept such a risk. Therefore they withdrew and consolidated against the AKP.

w The government’s brisk attitude against the northern Iraqi Kurdistan regional administration, especially last year, has also created an adverse reaction.

w Finally, another important aspect is last year’s military movements, the bombing of northern Iraqi PKK targets and extremely brisk interventions by the police in demonstrations in the region.

Along all these, the psychological campaign pursued by the DTP was very successful as well. The attitude, "Those who feel like a Kurd will vote for us. Not for the AKP. If you vote for the AKP, you’ll lose your Kurdish identity," was very effective. And when the DTP set the PKK and its sympathizers in motion, the population in the region adopted a conscious attitude. Election results featured the Kurdish identity. While increasing its votes from 4.9 to 5.6 percent, the DTP took back three new and many former provinces from the AKP. It increased the number of collectively controlled 56 municipalities to 98. What’s more important is that Diyarbakır Mayor Osman Baydemir broke a record by obtaining 65 percent of the votes.

The Kurdish messages were very clear:

The Kurdish identity is more important than anything else. No matter how much service you supply, the priority is the acceptance of our Kurdish identity. The Kurdish issue will be solved with politics, not weapons. The DTP needs to be our addressee for the Kurdish issue. This party represents us. It would be a pity if these three messages were not taken seriously by Ankara.

Let’s not push the DTP outside the system

If we evaluate the election results with a clear mind, we notice the necessity that the first step to be taken is to include the DTP in the system. Attitudes like not shaking hands with DTP deputies, not participating in programs they participate in, not inviting them although they are on the protocol list, should be abandoned. Instead of excluding the DTP, it is inevitable to embrace them and accept them as the addressee for steps to be taken in the Kurdish issue.