Fortunes for 2009

There seems to be no end to this case in 2009. Better to say that 2009 will be a cross road for the Ergenekon legend. Either the prosecution office will prove to us unexpectedly through surprise witnesses and new information that the case is justified, or the case will no longer prevail in our agendas because of lack of interest from the media.

In the beginning Ergenekon was a first. For the first time, untouchable illegal operations outside the formal state were touched. The Deep State, even though it is not determined what or who they were, was for the first time on trial before the law. It created great anxiety in this respect.

In the early morning hours of Jan. 20, anxiety started with the detention of Veli Küçük and eight people; turned into disappointment with the detention of editorial writer İlhan Selçuk and Doğu Perinçek on March 21, and it became serious with the detention of two full generals, Hurşit Tolon and Şener Eruygur, on July 1. During the Susurluk investigation the military could not be touched. This time two full generals were taken out of their army- controlled homes. There are still questions regarding Ergenekon. It would be nice if in 2009 the relationship between the Deep State and those who closed their eyes to the Hrant Dink murder, those who killed priest Santoro and those who organized other events were revealed. Otherwise the Deep State will again get off the hook.

AKP’s ascending period will end
In 2009 the most important development in regards to politics will be local elections. In general local elections are good for administrations. Those who benefit from municipalities chose a candidate from the present administration party. The Justice and Development Party, or AKP, is in this respect has the advantage. On the other hand candidates of the opposition, some places exempt, are weak in general. Meaning, there is no competition. Especially if we consider the effects of coal and food distribution to the poor, the AKP is expected to win easily.

But we should not forget about the fact that this party is slowly experiencing administration fatigue and an erosion of prestige. The AKP will experience a big handicap due to fraud accusations, the feeling of weariness in society, and more importantly, when the economic crisis starts showing its effects in the months to come, especially in the field of unemployment. One will look at how many votes the administrative party has obtained and not how many municipalities it won. The result will be compared to the 47 percent achieved in general elections. Besides the secular portion of society will use its votes and form a bloc. Meaning everybody will withdraw to their own camp. Taking into account that the Democratic Society Party, or DTP, takes back all votes that it formerly lost in the Southeast, we can expect the AKP to drop below 47 percent. Meaning the end of the ascending period.

The most critical development in 2009 will be in relations between Turkey and the European Union. For, in the decision taken in December 2006, the EU had stated that in case Turkey does not open its air and sea ports to Cypriot ships and aircrafts, meaning it has not conformed to the customs union, then the status of negotiations will be revised in December 2009.

I don’t think that there will be a result achieved in Cyprus. There is no such political intention shown on the Turkish or on the Greek side. Based on this possibility the EU might just suspend negotiations all together in 2009. Such a development may only be prevented if Turkey quickly takes up reforms and accelerates them, but I don’t see such a possibility. The AKP seems like it will continue its lack of emotion, if nothing unexpected happens.

In this case, will the EU be able to cut relations with Turkey? For suspending negotiations means not being able to restart them again. It would be naive to expect 27 countries to give a "yes" vote without receiving anything in return. Despite everything, I don’t believe the EU would cut Turkey loose. The commission would not suggest such an irreversible act. Chances are, Turkey will be given additional time.

The grim side of 2009 will be the growth of the crisis left for us by 2008. First it was a monetary crisis then it spread to the real economy sector. We thought it would be tangential but it wasn’t.

Economic crisis
Expected external funds will not arrive. Hell will break lose in the months to come. The first prevention firms will take is to lay off employees. The starting point of the crisis was the United States. From there it will spread to Europe. But everybody will pay the bill. The expectation in general is that this economic constriction will last until the end of 2009 or even the first half of 2010. The United States and Europe have built immense funds in order to protect their own companies. Our government, on the contrary, first denied and then, realizing that there is no escape, started to roll up its sleeves.

This crisis is AKP’s biggest fear. The AKP will lose votes because it will not be able to protect from deep wounds created by the crises; it’s not because of the Republican People’s Party, or CHP’s, MHP’s or any other party’s for that matter, effective politics. In crisis matters I’m pessimistic. I suppose that we will not be able to recover and lose a lot of blood if today’s formal attitude does not change.

The never changing and most important aspect of our agenda in 2009 will be again the PKK terror. Depending on the outcome of the local elections the intensity of the terror will either increase or decrease. But it will never subside. The Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, will again hit the cities É organize incursions toward security forces and keep up attention of the public. A lot of blood will be shed but the PKK will not achieve its target. Its biggest loss will be its former comfort in northern Iraq. It will not lose its caves and training centers in Quandil but won’t be able to establish camps along the border. It will be impossible for them to receive weapons or outfit supplies from Europe or other sources and for organization leaders to safely run around anymore.

Turkey’s position in the region
The foremost reason is that the Turkish government changed its attitude toward Barzani and Barzani in return decided to fine tune his politics in order not to antagonize Turkey. In 2009 relations between Ankara and Arbil will warm, mutual visits will increase and a new period will start. This declination will not mean that Barzani will kick the PKK out of northern Iraq or fight it, but put Turkey at ease. Let’s not forget that Turkey bombarding its PKK targets in northern Iraq can only be accomplished because the United States closes its eyes. After a while the responsibility of the region will pass to Baghdad and Arbil. If we sum up, in 2009 the PKK will be in trouble increasing the intensity of terror but will not achieve anything, foremost Öcalan.

The most unknown equation for 2009 is the politics of the new president of the United States, Obama, in respect to Turkey. For example will he pass the Armenian genocide allegations through congress? What will his attitude be toward the Cyprus issue?

These are important variables. What is known though is that while the United States is getting ready to separate from Iraq it has increased need for Turkey’s support É it will need Turkey’s support in preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power É it awaits Turkish soldiers in the fight against the resurrected Taliban in Afghanistan Éit will want to use the Turkish shield again against the progressing power increase of Russia É it is looking for the support of Turkey to protect peace in the Middle East.

Today’s environment and politics of AKP administration strengthens Turkey’s position in the region. In almost all problems Turkey’s voice can be heard. Sometimes it functions as a mediator, sometimes it plays the role of a catalyst; it does not turn its back on the region anymore. On the contrary, it attends to everybody’s problems.

In such a situation, we should not expect Obama to offend Turkey or take an attitude of pushing Turkey into a corner. On the contrary, we should expect Washington to support Ankara in EU negotiations, to take part in decision mechanisms regarding problems in the region. In short, we should expect Turkey’s strategic value to increase.